Russia: Emissions Without Concessions
John-Michael Cross
International climate agreements have used 1990 as the baseline year from which to measure reductions in greenhouse gases (GHGs), which immediately predates the political and economic collapse of the Soviet Union. As a consequence, former Soviet countries are all significantly below the emissions targets set forth by the Kyoto Protocol. This has not been due to climate change policies, but a failure to regain the levels of industrial production that had been maintained by the Kremlin [i]. These countries now possess a large excess of emissions credits, commonly referred to as “hot air.” There are fears that if these eastern European nations initiated a massive sell-off of the credits, it would flood the credit market and slash prices. While this has yet to happen, it remains a concern [ii].
Of the fifteen former Soviet countries, Russia emits by far the most GHGs. It is responsible for two-thirds of the group's GHG emissions, and emits five times more than Ukraine, the group's second-largest emitter. In fact, as of 2005, Russia trailed only China and the United States in GHG emissions (excluding LULUCF), emitting five percent of the world total [iii].
From 1990 to 1998, Russia's GHG emissions plummeted by more than 36%. Emissions have steadily risen since, but remain approximately 25% below 1990 levels. If the growth trend of the past few years is maintained, emissions in 2017 would be 12-15% below the baseline, and emissions would return to the 1990 level sometime around 2025 [vi]. Thus, any 2017 reduction target for Russia less stringent than 15% below the baseline allows the country to continue business-as-usual.
Russia has so far not been an active participant in the negotiations leading up to Copenhagen. It remains one of the few countries that has not yet set forth an emissions target proposal [v]. There have been reports that the Russian government drafted a paper outlining the dangers of climate change and the need for adaptation and mitigation strategies, but the paper has not been made public. While this is a big step for a government that historically cast doubt on the science of climate change, the international community is forced to speculate as to how Russia will approach both domestic and international climate policy.
Expectations remain tempered. Most predict that Russia will not agree to any target that will slow their emission growth trend for fear of impeding their economic recovery, while many expect they will negotiate to bank their unused emission credits for future compliance periods [vi]. Nevertheless, Russia's exact position remains uncertain. Until Moscow comes forward with a proposal, the international community will try to construct an agreement that will be adaptable to last-minute Russian involvement.
Works Cited
[i] David Adam. “World on track to meet Kyoto targets, says UN climate chief.” The Guardian. 18 November 2008.
[ii] “Russia to keep hold of 'hot air'.” Carbon Positive. 5 December 2008.
[iii] World Resources Institute. Climate Analysis Indicators Tool (CAIT).
[vi] Anna Korppoo. Russia and the Post-2012 Climate Regime. Briefing Paper 23. The Finnish Institute of International Affairs. November 2008. PDF
[v] Alister Doyle and Gerard Wynn. “Dispute on CO2 cuts forms roadblock to Copenhagen.” Reuters. 12 June 2009.
[vi] “Russia's climate policy fails to raise hopes.” EurActive. 19 May 2009.
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