Moving Beyond the Status Quo [ PDF ]

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Twenty Years After Valdez: The Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill

The author is Vice Admiral Clyde E Robbins USCG who was serving as the Coast Guard's Pacific Area Commander in California when he was reassigned to Valdez, Alaska and designated the Federal On Scene Coordinator for the Exxon Valdez spill from April until September, 1989.

What do the 1989 Exxon Valdez spill in Alaska and the current BP Deepwater Horizon spill in the Gulf of Mexico have in common? Crude Oil! And not much else, except the lawsuits that will prevail over the next couple of decades.

The Exxon Valdez ran aground on Bligh Reef in Prince William Sound, spilling some 11 million gallons of crude oil, most of which eventually found its way to the Alaskan shores. Those shores were mostly composed of rocks but a few were marshy areas and some could be called beaches. The water was cold and the weather inhospitable. Far removed from any population center, the logistical and political nightmares were quickly apparent. The press had a heyday. The ambulance chasers were everywhere. The "lower forty-eight" folks believed that Alaskan coastline was covered with oil when in fact, much less than 500 miles had been "oiled" at all and well less than a hundred miles were heavily oiled.

Still, the actual impact in Alaska was not insignificant and thousands of lives were impacted in some way. Exxon spent over $2 billion that first summer in '89 on the cleanup and is still fighting in courts to limit their losses. Yet, Exxon showed a huge profit for its stockholders in '89 and still continues to make money on its oil business.

It's hard to estimate what the Gulf spill will cost in terms of cleanup, environmental impact and damages to the livelihoods of thousands who depend on the resources gleaned from the Gulf and its shores. The estimated level of spillage has increased from 5,000 barrels per day at the time of writing this article, to as much as 60,000 barrels at the time of printing. If the current estimate is accurate (spillers are notorious for under-estimating spills), an amount of oil equal to the Exxon Valdez disaster is flowing into the Gulf every four days. Even if the drillers had successfully stopped the flow by now, the disastrous results of this spill far exceed the impact of the Exxon Valdez.

How so? The shoreline along the Alaskan coast is not densely populated. While there are many subsistence peoples who depend on the shoreline for their food and general livelihood, there are far more that may be impacted by the BP oil spill as it comes ashore in the Gulf States. This impact will be complicated by the continuous flow of the spill and the whims of nature as it spreads the spill around. Alaska's spill was "quick and dirty." While it took several weeks for the oil to go ashore up and down Alaska’s coastline, it was relatively easy to forecast where it was going and how bad it would be. While I don't wish to downplay the impact on the Alaskan shoreline, the Gulf spill is likely to be much worse. The continuous flow of the spill source and the fickle winds of nature could be an environmental disaster for the entire Gulf Coast.

Clyde E. Robbins

Vice Admiral Clyde E Robbins USCG walking on an oiled beach

So how to cope with such a spill? I suspect that there are few improvements over the methods we used in the Alaskan spill. There aren't many effective weapons in the oil cleanup arsenal that will meet the demands of all of us who care about the environment. A good fire associated with a spill might be the most effective weapon. When I was the Coast Guard Captain of the Port in Galveston, Texas, a tanker in-bound to Houston collided with an offshore rig. The subsequent fire consumed most of the spilled crude before it ever reached the shoreline. However, burning crude oil is not usually an option. Crude oil loses its light ends very rapidly and by the time the decision is made to burn it, it is impossible to ignite the oil without adding some other fuel--adding another pollutant to an already polluted waterway doesn't make much sense.

It doesn't appear to me that the Gulf spill is a good candidate for burning. As the oil makes its way to the surface it will be mixed with water; the light ends (the more volatile parts of petroleum) will be gone and it's doubtful if the spill would burn. And of course, even if it would burn, we should be mindful of adding carbon to the environment.

What's the next best choice? We often talk about dispersants, and they can be valuable in breaking up a spill before it reaches the shoreline. It's quite possible that it would be less damaging to break the oil into tiny globules and let Mother Nature help us fix things we've screwed up. So what happens to all those little bits of oil that are spread throughout the water column? I'm not qualified to answer that but certainly the sea creatures could tell you. Considering the huge volume of water in the Gulf however, it may not be significant when compared to the damage the oil can do when it goes ashore.

Dispersants are not a cure-all. Much of the oil in a large spill will eventually find it's way to shore, given the right currents, wind conditions, etc. Floating barriers can help, given the right circumstances, but they are affected by currents and tides and are of limited efficacy along seacoasts. So what do we do once the spill is on shore?

Some scientists believe that in many cases, it would be better to stand aside and let Mother Nature take care of the problem. Oil is part of our environment and the effort we put forth in cleaning up a spill often does more damage than good. They may be right but I can't imagine any responsible politician offering that up as a solution amid the screams of the press and the outcry of irate citizens.

So we do what we can, trying to strike a balance between not making the situation worse and beating the hell out of the shoreline. That balance is hard to reach. The U.S. Coast Guard is responsible for overseeing the cleanups. A Federal On Scene Coordinator (FOSC) is always either pre-assigned to an area or may be specially designated for a particular spill. I, as a Coast Guard Vice Admiral, was specially designated for the first summer cleanup of the Exxon Valdez spill. I had not been directly involved in a spill cleanup since my Galveston tour some 15 years before the Valdez spill. What I found upon my arrival on scene wasn't very encouraging. I thought I would have a lot to learn about new tactics and equipment that had been developed. Unfortunately, that was not the case. Tactics and equipment hadn't changed -- they were no more effective in '89 than they were in the mid-seventies!

Generally, Exxon used high-pressure hot water to wash the oil off the shoreline, caught it with barriers in the water, and then used skimmers to suck it up. Eventually Exxon would load it on a barge and transport it to Oregon to a hazardous land fill. In some areas it was impossible to use this method. For instance, in marshy areas, removal of oil polluted soil was the preferred method but it's not a very pretty operation. Tearing up a wetland to "save" the wetland doesn't make a lot of sense unless leaving the oil there will cause so much damage there is no other alternative. Fortunately, soil removal wasn't necessary in most cases. Some times simple removal by using a hand shovel and bucket was pretty effective.

Of course, "bioremediation" was a solution to the cleanup problem that appeared to be beyond our grasp. There were plenty of detergents available but the side effects of using them and getting them into the water column were lethal. What we needed was something to "break down" the oil that had covered the rocky shores so that it could enter the surrounding environment without damaging it. We found that the French had developed a mixture, called "Inipol," which appeared to be very effective. When applied, it certainly improved the appearance of the shoreline but the long-term impact of its application is controversial. Apparently it was so controversial that it is no longer manufactured.

In the final analysis, cleanup of oil spills is difficult and like any medicine, there are bad side effects no matter what process you employ. The Gulf spill will be no different; there is no "silver bullet." As long as we have the insatiable appetite for oil and its byproducts, we're going to have spills, and like it or not, we have to accept the risks associated with that entire enterprise from extraction to final delivery to the customer. The trick is to bring that risk down to a level that we can be more comfortable with. We can mitigate the risk through application of technology, insistence on safe practices and strong government and industry oversight. We can also strive to develop methods to more effectively deal with spills once they occur. And, of course, the best way to reduce the risk of a spill is to aggressively pursue alternative fuels to drive our economy.

VADM Clyde E Robbins, USCG (ret)

SPRING 2010 Climate Alert

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